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Abstract 
 
Networks have been a hot topic in recent years, not only in 
mainstream media but also in academic literature. The sociological 
interest in industrial networks is one of multiple levels and surely stems 
from the question if networks can benefit society. It was the purpose 
of this paper to research the emergence of the study of networks or 
industrial networks and validate, using articles concerned with the 
matter, if they are in fact a new concept in business or not. 
Considering the review of literature, one can conclude that by no 
means are networks in business a novelty but a logical consequence 
of human relationships in general and also that network structures 
have been present long before their discovery through academia, 
only not identified as such. It was found that the previous definition of 
market structures in business, while maneuvering between the two 
extremes of hierarchy and a free market, may have been too rigid 
and networks provided an excellent alternative term. It can further 
be suggested that the study of networks should focus on exchange 
mechanisms, cultural differences and emotional involvement as 
industrial networks may differ in their degrees of freedom, scale and 
purpose but always rely on reciprocity, as do all human relationships.  
 
 
Key words: Networks; industrial networks 
JEL codes: D21, L16, O12 
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The world is composed of networks – not groups. 
Barry Wellman1  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This universal and substantial quote by Wellman proves helpful to demonstrate the 
controversial attitude that the study of networks provokes. Networks have been all the 
hype, disregarding if we are referring to the media attention on terms such as Social 
Networks or Business Networking or in fact the recent academic research in different areas 
such as Politics and Sociology. It should also not be disregarded that the sociological 
interest in industrial networks is one of multiple levels. Politically it should be questioned if 
these types of networks can benefit society and can thus be the object of academic 
research in order to improve the economic use of resources and thus reduce waste.  
As Karen Cook and Richard Emerson2 defined networks of social actors as sets of 
connected exchange relations it becomes clear why the main concentration of the study of 
networks is usually set on the exchange of economic goods and services as these are the 
most common mean of exchange between social actors within a market. 
In order to keep the sociological focus, we will look at the sociology of organisations which 
analyses organisations in the midst of other organisations3 (Lucien Karpik, 1978). Thus this 
specific field studies organisations within the economy, or businesses e.g. joint ventures and 
strategic alliances. Research questions are mostly centered on the issues of the 
organisation of power and interactions within and between organisations. Subsequently it 
is studied how businesses try to control an environment of suppliers, customers and 
competition which is naturally outside of their area of influence. Early studies have found 
that markets are not of an atomistic and independent structure but highly interrelated (e.g. 
Frans N. Stokman/ Rolf Ziegler/ John Scott 1985) and it should go without saying that this 
                                                           
1 P. 31 Barry Wellman, Structural Analysis: From Method and Metaphor to Theory and Substance." P. 19-61 in Social 
Structures: A Network Approach, edited by Barry Wellman and S.D. Berkowitz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988 
2 Karen S. Cook, Richard M. Emerson Power, equity and commitment in exchange networks American Sociological Review1978, 
Vol. 43 (October)^: 721-739 
3 P. 471 Renate Mayntz, Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen;  1996/1993 
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result is of macroeconomic significance as it emphasizes the importance of interaction 
inside markets.  
It is a focus of this paper to research the emergence of the study of networks or industrial 
networks and connect this rise of attention the subject experienced in academia with its 
previous existence or in fact as it is sometimes labeled, the emergence of networks in 
business in general. Mainly we will concentrate on the works written by Renate Mayntz4 
and those of Oliver E. Williamson and Walter Powell.5  
 
 
The origins: Studying networks in Sociology 
 
Mayntz examines the history of how and since when networks are studied, her interest 
particularly are policy networks. She cites Roger Hollingsworth6 (1990) who identified in 
his policy studies that U.S. companies reacted towards anti-cartel legislation by integrating 
horizontally and vertically and thus formed hierarchical economic structures and further 
concluded this development as a historic fact. This collective movement of acquiring 
suppliers, competitors and vendors resulted in the emergence of Multi National Companies 
(hereafter MNCs) which of course needed a substantial increase in capital and thus, 
Hollingsworth argues, the emergence of investment banks was caused. After the 1950s the 
importance of investment banks diminished sporadically and Hollingsworth suggests the 
emergence of obligational networks to be the reason for this economic transformation. He 
further defines an obligational network as the assembly of interactive relationships 
between companies.  
Mayntz7 distinguishes between promotional networks which have a high focus on Research 
and Development and are mostly found in fast moving and innovative industries, and 
policy networks, which are decision making groups mainly studied in Political Sciences. 
These are interesting to research as they contradict the clear separation of state and 
society and also the definition of the state as the highest policy maker in the political 
hierarchy. If policy networks form, decisions are made by finding agreements between 
different actors and thus decisions are made collaboratively rather that by the strongest 
party in the hierarchy. The reasons for the emergence of policy networks, Mayntz states, 
are that power was relocated to different interest groups and also the formation of unions 
                                                           
4 Renate Mayntz, Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen;  1996/1993 
5Oliver E. Williamson The economic institutions of capitalism, chapters  1, 7 & 8,; 1990/1985;  Walter W. Powell , Neither 
market nor hierarchy: Network Organisation 1996/1990 
6P . 472 Renate Mayntz, Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen;  1996/1993 
7P. 473 Renate Mayntz, Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen;  1996/1993  
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and other organisations in order to represent the interests of such groups. The obvious goal 
of policy networks is thus collective decision making, but underlying this uncontroversial 
purpose it is problem solving. The result is a diversification of political power and a 
weaker state. Thus policy networks are a result of the structural change in modern society 
apart from the usual measurements such as the growth in GNP per capita and education 
above all from the functional differentiation, as identified by and often connected to 
Talcott Parsons, within society on a macroeconomic level8. Functional subsystems in society 
evolved and were defined by a shared border, identity and a relative autonomy from the 
outside, which authors such as Niklas Luhmann identified as the most crucial factor for 
subsystems to emerge.9 One example of this structure of sectoral self regulation is the 
British Science Council10. Mayntz argues that no subsystem, may it be the health or 
education, could have achieved this degree of autonomy and functional differentiation 
without an increase in organisations within society.  But she also states that this is only a 
possible reason for policy networks not an imperative.  
There are substantial differences to be found between Eastern European and Western 
European states as there was little functional differentiation in former socialist states where 
the state administered education and all other sectors which were important for the 
economy and the society as a whole. She argues further that the fall of Eastern Germany 
was not a revolt against political repression but a result of restricted innovation, flexibility 
and reactionism and thus a lack of modernization and subsequently choice. Mayntz further 
connects this to the conclusion that the ability to make decisions without restraint, thus 
freely, and responsibly is necessary for all collective decision making in 
interorganisational. The existence of Policy Networks within a society is thus an indicator 
for modernisation and a restricted power of the state.11  
Earlier Powell(1975)12 identified and defined networks as hybrids between free market 
and hierarchy structures and continues to describe the synthesis by which networks are 
created when formal organisations destroy quasi-groups and substitute them by formal 
hierarchies. Subsequently these growing organisations destroy the existing hierarchies and 
thus create networks. Economic development thus takes place when oligopolistic structures 
eliminate monopolies followed by the emergence of MNCs and interest groups. The 
network may thus be an alternative between the free market, where actors are by 
definition unable to control negative externalities and hierarchy, in which repression takes 
place through a planned economy which is administered by the state.  
                                                           
8 P. 474 Ibid.  
9 P. 475 Ibid.  
10 P. 22-23 Renate Mayntz,  Funktionelle Teilsysteme in der Theorie sozialer Differenzierung, S. 11-44 in R. Mayntz/ B. 
Rosewitz/ U. Schimank/ R. Stichweh, Differenzierung und Verselbstständigung. Zur Entwicklung gesellschaftlicher Teilsysteme. 
Frankfurt a.M.: Campus1988 
11P . 475,  Renate Mayntz, Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen;  1996/1993 
12P. 214, Powell, Walter W. (1996/1985)Weder Markt noch Hierarchie: Netzwerkartige Organisationsformen. In: Kenis, 
Patrick/ Schneider, V. (Hg.) Organisation und Netzwerk: Institutionelle Steuerung in Wirtschaft und Politik. Frankfurt/ Main: 
Campus S. 213-271 
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The until then mainly ignored idea by Ronald Coase (1937)13 that the firm as a 
governance structure is by no means a black box, but an interdependent structure, was 
picked up by Williamson(1975/1990/1985)14 in order to construct  his transactional cost 
theory. He mainly stated that transactions which require substantial investments and are 
recurring but have an uncertain outcome are far more likely to take place in hierarchical 
organisations rather than in a free market framework. Further he stated that transactions 
which are straight-forward, non-repetitive and require low transaction investments are 
more likely to take place in a market structure. Companies subsequently react by moving 
transactions out of the market as knowledge specific to the transactions builds up because, 
he assumes, there is bounded rationality as contracts cannot cover all contingencies and 
also because of  opportunism because actors will most likely follow their self-interest. He 
states that firms are separated from markets and the society because they are 
opportunistic.  
The transaction cost theory further states that all those costs incurred by making an 
economic exchange can be either search and information costs, which are incurred in 
determining that the required good is available on the market and who is offering the 
lowest price or bargaining costs, which are those costs required to come to an acceptable 
agreement with the other party and thus formulate an appropriate contract. Policing and 
enforcement costs are further defined as those costs which are incurred to make sure the 
other party sticks to the terms of  contract and taking appropriate legal action if this turns 
out not to be the case. Further he defines the costs for searching for the best suppliers, 
partners and customers and also the cost for establishing a valid contract which mainly 
concern the monitoring and enforcing of the implementation of the contract. 
Transaction costs are unnecessary as they are not directly connected to production, thus 
firms will try to avoid incurring them, Williamson argues. They can also be called 
coordination costs, which are well defined as the costs of ´all the information processing 
necessary to coordinate the work of people and machines that perform the primary 
processes, whereas production costs include the costs incurred from the physical or other 
primary processes necessary to create and distribute the goods or services being 
produced´. 
From this standpoint originated his theory of transaction cost economics which states that 
the costs and difficulties associated with market transactions sometimes favor hierarchies or 
in-house production and sometimes markets as an economic governance structure.  
                                                           
13 P. 2 Williamson, Oliver E. (1990/ 1985) Kap. 1,7 und 8. In: ders. Die ökonomischen Institutionen des Kapitalismus. 
Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, S. 17-48 und S. 186-236 
14 Ibid.  
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Later Powell (1996/1990)15 formulated a critique of the rigid approach to categorising 
organisational structures. He argued for the existence of networks, rather than the two 
extremes of market or hierarchy. His main argument was that firms are blurring their 
borders and increasingly collaborate in hybrid forms between hierarchy and market in 
order to benefit from economies of scale, reliable interconnections within their industries 
and various suppliers. 16 Powell does not agree that the market-hierarchy continuum 
restricts the form of organisation of firms as this argument is historically inaccurate and too 
static. Markets have never been the beginning of transactions and hierarchies were not the 
end points. Also, he argues, that reciprocity and collaboration are not considered. 
Examples which are stated here are the research by Larson (1988) on High-tech start-ups 
in the Sillicon Valley and also the work of Lorenzoni & Ornatio (1988)17 on craft based 
firms in Italy, which show clearly that the network structure was key to success in these 
regions. He expresses his view that ´networks are lighter on their feet´18and ´that the 
distinction between markets and hierarchies is too rigid for the reality of inter-firm 
relations and that their structures are too diverse to be classified between these two pillars 
solely. ` 
Powel illustrates his argumentation for several network forms by using different industries 
as examples for successful networks.  Networks in craft industries for example have 
existed for centuries and are by no means a new invention as the work has always been 
project-based because unique products are created. Similar prerequisites determine the 
nature of most construction firm networks too, as the relationships between general 
contractors and  subcontractors are usually stable so that a quasi-firm emerges 
(Eccles,1981). Less rigid networks, but never the less network structures, can be found in 
publishing where mostly autonomous subsidiaries collaborate and a large degree for 
freedom for authors persists. The same applies to film and recording industries where 
great unpredictability and high variance cause uncertainties.  
Further he refers to regional economies and industrial districts such as the German textiles 
network which is a close community network of highly specialized manufacturers and 
suppliers in the South West of Germany and the Emilian model in Italy which consists of a 
small group of firms closely connected in a vertical manner.19 He also refers to extended 
trading groups which are different national economies relying on trust and networks more 
than western markets e.g. Japan and Sweden. Here competition is taking place between 
different interest groups based on development and knowledge accumulation rather than 
price. An alternative to mergers and acquisitions are strategic alliances and partnerships 
                                                           
15 Powell, Walter W. Weder Markt noch Hierarchie: Netzwerkartige Organisationsformen. In: Kenis, Patrick/ Schneider, V. 
(Hg.) Organisation und Netzwerk: Institutionelle Steuerung in Wirtschaft und Politik. Frankfurt/ Main: Campus S. 213-271 
16 For a summary of Powell´s categorization of the differences between market, hierarchy and network please consider 
appendix I 
17P. 217  Powell, Walter W. (1990) 
18P. 220 Powell, Walter W. (1990)  
19P. 233  Powell, Walter W. (1990) 
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between companies where equity arrangements, collaborative agreements and joint 
ventures substitute the purchasing of companies. 
Even when network structures are meant to be implemented by a certain company, there 
are certain pitfalls which may prevent those structures to prevail. Not only must the 
Management be enthusiastic about the organizational change but all employees and other 
members should share this sentiment in order to ensure the implementation. Further 
organizational changes are always connected to high costs, especially when installing a 
collaboration infrastructure within a company that was previously organised in a way that 
leaned more towards a hierarchical culture. When assuming that the collaboration levels 
between partners rise one has to also consider that competition could arise when trade 
details are portrayed more openly.  
Mariotti and Cainarca (1986)20 argued for a trend in vertical disaggregation because 
companies are becoming smaller again in order to concentrate on their core competencies. 
This trend can be attributed to the inability of large companies to react quickly towards 
change, a resistance to process innovations and also a resistance to develop new products 
when they become too large to be agile.  Powell further describes the etiology of network 
firms as the following: There has to be effective cooperation in the long run; Incentives for 
learning and dissemination of information must be given continuously; Networks are most 
useful when resources are variable and results are uncertain; further there have to be high 
means to using/enhancing tacit knowledge and technological innovation.  
According to Powell know-how, demand for speed and trust are the critical components of 
networks in order to be successful and it can hardly be disputed that this is true, however it 
can be agreed also that these components are more or less critical for every business to 
succeed, not solely networks.  
 
 
Industrial Networks 
 
In order to clarify what exactly industrial networks consist of different authors were taken 
as points of reference. Among those were Hakansson and Johanson, who differentiate 
between the much studied social networks21 and the term industrial network by 
emphasizing the importance of activities and interdependencies within industrial networks 
as opposed to the mere existence of connections between different actors within a social 
                                                           
20 P. 226  from Powell, Walter W. (1990) 
21Burt 1982; Cook and Emerson 1978, Iacobucci and Hopkins 1992; Willer and Andersson 1981  
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network. They further elaborate that these industrial network models and the activities 
within them are interconnected with the resources used and the actors of the network. 
Industrial networks, according to Hakansson and Johanson, present the difficulty of 
producing interdependencies and thus results of actors´ activities which reach ´far beyond 
the horizon of the single actor´.22 
The main characteristics of networks as governance structures were further defined by 
them as the dynamics of elementary structuring and restructuring, caused by power 
struggles within the networks. The viability of network governance structures depend on the 
individual actor´s ability to view, convey and administer a network structure as opposed to 
a market and hierarchy governance. Thus not external industry characteristics are key in 
this analysis, but the understanding of actors within the existing or potential network to 
perceive it as such.  
 
 
Industrial networks - A new way of conducting business? 
 
Berger et. al23 are considering the globalisation debate on a larger scale amongst others 
who do so are Martin and Schumann (1996) and Friedmann (1999)24 who state that 
globalization is irreversible and caused by the development of new information 
technology, the liberalization of trade and a substantial rise in competition. Thus they 
argue that investment across borders increases and that national political institutions will 
lose power. This extreme view is contrasted with the argument of the ´contemporary 
globalisation´ before World War I (Zevin, 1992; Strikwerda, 1993; Wade, 1996)25 and 
further the strong concentration of MNCs on the culture of their home society (Hirst and 
Thompson 1996)26. Examples of this concentration are IBM, Coca-Cola and Microsoft which 
keep a distinct U.S. character to their companies. It also needs to be considered that there 
are various types of networks implemented in business as, e.g. the virtual enterprise,  
defined as ´(a) temporary network, with some stability, of independent firms connected 
through ICT (information & communication technologies), with the aim of reducing costs and 
(increasing) market share´ (Kovács & Moniz 2000).  
                                                           
22 P. 46 Hakansson, Hakan/ Johanson, J. (1993) The network as a government structure: interfirm cooperation beyond 
markets and hierarchies. In: Grabher, Gernot (Hg.) The ebedded firm: on the socio-economics of industrial networks. New 
York: Routledge 
23 P. 60 Berger, Susanne; Constanze Kurz, Timothy Sturgeon, Ulrich Voskamp & Volker Wittke (2001) Globalization, 
Production Networks, and National Models of Capitalism – On the Possibilities of new Productive Systems and Institutional 
Diversity in an Enlarging Europe, SOFI-Mitteilungen Nr 29/2001 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid. ; pp. 80 – 96 
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Michael Wortmann argues that MNCs are no free global networks but ´network-like 
manufacturing structures (…) which are still confined regionally´27 He uses the argument 
that FDI is no indicator for an increased degree of the growth of MNCs and thus 
globalization on a business level. Jannika Mattes28 refers to three problems caused by the 
physical distance and heterogeneous context in international innovation projects which 
could be applied to other contexts too. She finds that the distribution of power is 
complicated as are the creation of trust and the communication between participating 
actors. Thus internationalisation complicates the creation of trust and MNCs are by no 
means an indicator of a changing business paradigm or an ever increasing degree of 
globalization. Mattes further states that localization is necessary for companies in order to 
succeed in local markets.  
It needs to be mentioned here that network structures do by no means guarantee 
systemrational decision making as greediness and selfishness cannot be guaranteed to be 
eliminated but they do ideally facilitate them. In networks bargaining or generalized 
political exchange (Marin 1990)29 is not only a key characteristic but it also takes place 
on a multilateral rather than bilaterally or indirectly. Mayntz states also that not only is 
bargaining the key in policy networks but also strategic interaction. Thus, if there is a 
common interest to solve a problem or change a situation issue networks will form to solve 
this specific problem according to the needs of those actors interested in the issue. In order 
to do so successfully Mayntz mentions cooperation and a common system interest as 
necessary. 
In order for negotiations in policy networks to be successful it needs to be considered and 
realized that different actors have their self-interest in mind. Thus, as it is also mentioned in 
game theory, actors have to be willing to compromise and follow rules which they consider 
worthy and relevant. Further it has to be assumed that all actors within the system have to 
act rationally. Wilke30 states correctly that the problem of complex interdependencies is 
the blind eye actors persist to have towards externalities due to them following their self-
interest. Thus decision making in policy networks depends mainly on a common direction of 
interest but also on the ability of the individual actors to collaborate and compromise. Not 
the single decisions are key in cooperative long-term alliances but an acceptance of 
responsibilities, identities and the institutional arrangement as such. Chester Barnard 
(1950)31 identified the zone of indifference as crucial for successful collective decision 
making and thus a certain personal distance that is necessary for successful decision 
                                                           
27 P. 1 Wortmann, Michael (2000) What is new about ´global´ corporations? Interpreting statistical data on corporate 
internationalization Discussion Paper FS I 00 – 102, Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung, Berlin 
28 P. 6 Mattes, Jannika (2006) Innovation in multinational companies – An empirical analysis of innovation networks between 
globalization and localization, Bamberg. From: Bamberger Beitäge zur Europaforschung und zur internationalen Politik Nr. 
14 
29 P. 18 Marin, Bernd (Hg.) (1990) Generalized Political Exchange. Antagonistic Cooperation and Integrated Policy Circuits. 
Frankfurt a.M.: Campus  
30 P. 484, Renate Mayntz, Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen;  1996/1993 
31 P. 485, Renate Mayntz, Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen;  1996/1993 
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making. Niklas Luhman (1964)32 has also examined the conflict of interest in the process of 
collective decision making and identified an acceptance of authority as crucial. Actors thus 
have to be willing and able to base their decisions on external rule without considering 
possible costs or advantages for themselves solely and keep a personal distance to the 
issues discussed or problems to be solved.  
One can argue that this requirement might be of theoretical significance; however it needs 
to be questioned if it is possible for actors to move away from their self-interest. This could 
only take place when a normative identification with the task to be carried out takes place 
and also if there is no additional cost for the decision maker. It can thus help to choose 
supposedly neutral and objective individuals to make decisions in policy networks.  I would 
like to argue that this argument is rarely realized in practice as actors are usually unable 
to ignore their self-interest as, e.g. political actors will not act against their self-interest of 
being re-elected and thus will not make decisions in a way that the relevant public will 
disagree with. It is however possible that the interest in the policy network overpowers the 
individual self-interests of involved actors. Mayntz argues that a loose connection between 
principal and agent can be found when the normative-ideological integration within an 
organization is low and when the actor strives to be flexible towards his environment. 
Further it is beneficial when the actor´s interest is not clear or not yet defined. She also 
states that problem solving in policy networks could be made possible despite different 
interests by ensuring that there is a flexible connection of multilevelsystems, differentiation 
of prime Identification and orientation and also a lack of defined strategic objectives.  
However there is a weak spot with this suggestion of a recipe for successful decision 
making in policy networks as later instances have to accept the achieved consensus and 
results but will rarely agree completely. Also it is difficult to determine what an adequate 
and system-rational result would be as perspectives differ and not all actors or authorities 
to be considered will perceive the solution as equally beneficial for the system interest.  
From a business studies perspective Hakansson et. al33 identified collaboration between 
different companies and thus strategizing in industrial networks, especially on a global 
level as crucial, in order to succeed in the market. One could conclude that this strengthens 
the argument that we live in a network society which requires cooperation between 
companies in order to grow, innovate and compete but also this statement is so broad and 
general in its´ implications that it could be applied to nearly all market structures, times 
and industries while still holding true. Collaboration through strategic networks, when 
implemented successfully, will most likely always benefit the industry concerned.  
                                                           
32 P. 485, Renate Mayntz, Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen;  1996/1993 
33 P. 1 Hakansson, Hakan; Lars-Erik Gadde, Lars Huemer (2003) Strategizing in industrial networks From: Industrial 
Marketing Management 32  357 -364 
 
14 
 
Networks- The question of scale and purpose 
 
The network-hype in academia and mainstream media can be interpreted as the 
discovery of a new concept or even as the documentation of a substantial change of 
society triggered by technological development and globalization but it appears to be a 
concept that was always present and also used by most even if in substantially different 
ways. A personal network of a close-knit family is just as much a network as that of a 
village or town in which different people fulfill different tasks and collaborate on some, as 
e.g. the farmer and the baker or even the whole-sale which subsequently sells the finished 
product.  
The main questions that research on networks should concern are those of scale and 
purpose. Thus what reason does a network have to exist and how large and complicated 
must it be in order to serve its purpose successfully. Further the cultural differences in 
building up and dealing with networks are interesting, especially for the social sciences. It 
is for example remarkable how competition and collaboration are both present in 
networks or how information s processed within them in order to facilitate learning.  
Macneil (1985)34 identified in a rather flowery language that ´entangling the strings of 
reputation, friendship, interdependence, and altruism´ is the key to a successful network 
and thus emphasizes the importance of emotional reciprocity within networks.  
Technological industries are often cited as being the ideal environment for network 
structures to strive but it can be argued that they are solely the leaders of networks which 
are naturally facilitated by communication technology and the need for innovation and the 
development of new products. Kaneko and Imai (1987) stated that information, which is 
crucial for technological industries in the form of patents and innovation, in networks is 
´thicker´ than in the market and ´freer´ than that in a hierarchy. 35 The reasons for this are 
that technology is often composed of tacit knowledge which cannot simply be bought 
through acquisitions. Companies here also act more risk averse on a financial and strategic 
level.  
                                                           
34
 P. 220 Powell, Walter W. (1990) 
35
P. 225  Powell, Walter W. (1990)  
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4. Conclusion 
 
Considering the review of academic literature concerned with the study of networks from 
all different fields and subsequently consolidating those in order to answer the research 
question one can conclude that by no means are networks in business a novelty but a 
logical consequence even if not of a globalising economy directly but definitely of human 
relationships in general.  
However it needs to be stated that the academic attention on network structures could 
potentially prove beneficial for society, especially if the focus is set on a sociological or 
political standpoint rather than an economic interest in order to maximize profits. It needs 
to be questioned if networks should be treated as an alternative way to conduct business 
or if the previous starting point for the analysis of market structures, especially in 
economics and business studies was too rigid and uniform already, maneuvering between 
the two extremes of hierarchy and free market.  
Reciprocity can be identified as a key characteristic as actions and interactions may be 
based on self-interest, indebtedness or cultural values according to the theoretical 
framework used. Further it can be concluded that trust is created through long-term 
reciprocity and this often results in success (Arrow, 1974)36. The nature of these exchange 
mechanisms, cultural differences and emotional involvement should be a focus of the study 
of industrial networks. In conclusion it needs to be questioned if the study of networks 
should even consider them as a new phenomenon as it is possible that their discovery 
solely means that previous assumptions about market structures have been false, thus 
every market structure is a network of some kind, just implying different degrees of 
freedom, scale and purpose.   
                                                           
36
 P. 226  Powell, Walter W. (1990) 
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